Tragedy at Dieppe Read online

  The order was unusually concise—just two pages. Roberts explained this brevity as resulting from his loss of Church Mann “to a higher formation. I propose, therefore, to leave the working out of these plans in detail to the [brigade] commanders.” Mann, of course, was an almost constant presence at divisional headquarters, but one totally engaged in keeping Jubilee steaming along. Foothold also provided a neat cover within which the actual forces for Jubilee could be organized.19 To the soldiers and officers preparing for Foothold, it seemed they engaged in nothing more serious than yet another staged invasion—something they could do almost in their sleep.

  Except for the changes introduced towards the end of July, Jubilee was Rutter reborn. And that plan had been constructed by Combined Operations with significant alterations made by Montgomery—who was no longer involved. On August 7, he had been appointed to command the land forces of Operation Torch, the new code name for the North African invasion, which was set for October. This was to be a joint Anglo-American affair, with Eisenhower in overall command. Sledgehammer was now formally scrubbed. In the meantime, Churchill and Alan Brooke had gone to Cairo on July 31 and were then to proceed to Moscow for discussions with Stalin. During meetings in Cairo on August 4, the senior British staff there agreed to Brooke and Churchill’s recommendation that Montgomery switch from command of Operation Torch to heading up Eighth Army and its defence of Egypt.20 Montgomery duly arrived in Cairo on August 12.

  By that time, Churchill and Brooke were en route to Moscow, where they received a stormy reception. Stalin remained adamant there should be a major offensive across the Channel to force the Germans to draw divisions away from the Russian front. Churchill could only offer the Dieppe raid and Operation Torch as substitutes capable of achieving the same end. Worrying that the raid on Dieppe might again be cancelled, he signalled his Chief of Staff, General Hastings Ismay, on August 15. “What is the position about renewal of Rutter?” the cable pleaded. Ismay replied quickly. “Jubilee, which is renewed Rutter in all essential features, is due to be carried out First Light 18 August. If weather unfavourable 18th August, operation can be launched any subsequent day up to 24th August inclusive.” Churchill assured Stalin there would be a “reconnaissance in force” against Dieppe.21

  Back in southern England, the brigadiers, battalion commanders, and company commanders assembled on August 14 in the senior officers’ mess at 2nd Divisional headquarters at 0930 hours. Roberts announced that the raid was back on and would take place between August 18 and 22. Full operation orders and instructions were issued down to the company commanders.22 While most were excited by the prospect of action, a few were dismayed. Essex Scottish captain Walter McGregor was dumbfounded that anybody would conceive of raiding the same port as set out in Operation Rutter after some 5,500 men had been on leave throughout England.23 Lieutenant Colonel Doug Catto argued that the plan was “fraught with alarming warnings of possible disaster.” He was particularly concerned about his regiment’s attack at Puys. Before Catto could finish his protests, Mann wheeled on him and barked, “If you want to keep your command, keep your mouth shut.”24 Whatever dissent might have stirred in the room beforehand was silenced.

  At 1130 hours, the 6th Brigade’s battalion and company commanders were given the opportunity to study the model—each battalion was allowed forty minutes. Then the officers spent the afternoon carefully going over the plan, which largely involved refreshing themselves on the role they were to have played in Rutter.25

  Other than the addition of commandos to replace the airborne troops, little had changed. As in the original scheme, there would be six assaults consisting of two outer flank attacks, two inner flank attacks, and the main attack delivered directly against Dieppe and its harbour.

  The four flank attacks were to begin at 0450 hours, British Summer Time. The “success of these flank landings would depend very largely upon the achievement of surprise, and upon the landing craft touching down while it was still sufficiently dark to make it difficult for enemy gunners who might be on the alert to see their targets,” as one army report put it. “No arrangements, therefore, were made for naval fire support on these beaches in the first phase.”

  At 0520 hours, half an hour after the beginning of nautical twilight, two 4th Brigade battalions would land at Dieppe. The Essex Scottish would attack the eastern half (Red Beach) and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry the western half (White Beach). Simultaneously, the first wave of Calgary Tank Regiment tanks, consisting of three troops, would set down. More waves of tanks would follow in close sequence.

  Royal Canadian engineers would land on the heels of the two assaulting battalions and assist the tanks in crossing the beach and getting through or over the esplanade seawall. They would also detect and clear minefields, as well as destroy heavy obstructions known to be blocking the streets facing the beach.

  Once the tanks crossed the esplanade, they would press through Dieppe “and assist in clearing German gun positions south of the town and in capturing the entrenched position west of Les Quatre Vents Farm (Four Winds Farm), which was about one and a half miles inland from Green Beach at Pourville. The tanks would then link up with the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders advancing from Green Beach and support their attacks on the airfield and divisional headquarters.

  The Rileys were to push out of Dieppe towards Quatre Vents Farm and join up with the South Saskatchewan Regiment, which would have led the way onto Green Beach. These two battalions would clear German resistance to the southwest of Dieppe. The Essex Scottish, meanwhile, would seize Dieppe’s harbour and capture several armed trawlers. Assisted by tanks and a detachment of No. 40 Royal Marines’ ‘A’ Commando, who were to be landed by Motor Gunboat Locust and several French chasseurs (wooden submarine chasers similar to motor torpedo boats), the Essex would clear the area southeast of Dieppe and link up with the Royal Regiment of Canada—coming in from Blue Beach at Puys.

  This would conclude establishment of a perimeter around Dieppe. While the Camerons and supporting tanks operated outside of it against the airfield and headquarters, engineering parties within would wreak destruction on dock facilities, bridges, railway installations, a railroad tunnel, and other targets, in accordance with a tight script. Brigadier Mann thought it “doubtful if any programme for the destruction of objectives of a similar nature has ever been so completely and scientifically prepared. Personnel had been sent on special courses to study the destruction of particular objectives, the stores had been especially prepared, and the parties rehearsed in their duties.”

  There was even a “well arranged train wreck, which was a saboteur’s dream. A number of cars were to be derailed well inside the tunnel, and then a train with a good load of explosives was to be sent in with open throttle.” The tunnel was southwest of Dieppe, immediately east of Petit Appeville. Its destruction would disrupt rail movement from Dieppe to Le Havre or Rouen for “a very considerable time.” Other demolitions would render the harbour “largely useless for a long period.”

  A detailed withdrawal plan existed. All the troops ashore, save those of Nos. 3 and 4 Commandos, who had their own re-embarkation schemes, would fall back upon Dieppe. Withdrawal was to be carefully coordinated, lasting several hours and requiring the battalions to withdraw to specific pre-set defensive lines. There were thirteen of these. Once one was reached, a coded signal alerted Leigh-Mallory at Uxbridge that he was free to direct bombers to strike outside this zone. The thirteenth line, for example, would be reached at three hours and thirty minutes during a two-tide operation. This zone would be practically on top of the buildings facing the esplanade, and the coded signal was “Obliterate.”26

  Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, remaining off Dieppe during the assault, would land to provide a rearguard covering the re-embarkation of assault forces on the western side of Dieppe’s beach. On the eastern side, the Essex Scottish would perform the same duty. Once all other troops were at sea, the
rearguard battalions would re-embark and the raid come to a close.27

  One aspect of the plan that bothered many was the delayed timing for the landing at Dieppe. With the flank attacks occurring thirty minutes prior, the garrison troops inside the town were sure to be alerted by the time the Rileys and Essex Scottish reached the beach. Why could the landings here not be concurrent with those on the flanks?

  It was a question Hughes-Hallett had explained repeatedly to the other force commanders. “Simultaneous attacks all along the front at Dieppe were impracticable for naval reasons,” he said. There was simply not enough sea room for all ships and craft to shoulder in together. The vessels, jockeying to avoid each other in such a confined area, would be thrown into chaos. “Moreover the differences between ships’ speeds constituted a serious obstacle. In order to put in the main attack at the same time as the flank attacks it would have been necessary to sail the LSIs from Southampton half an hour earlier than [scheduled]; and in that event they would inevitably [be] spotted by the Germans’ routine evening air reconnaissance as they left the harbour.” So the frontal attack had to come later, even though this meant loss of surprise.28

  Like the military plan, the naval plan was highly complex, minutely detailed, and reliant on a timetable that must unroll with unfailing precision for the raid to succeed. Excluding the sixteen minesweepers, which would clear the two passages through the minefield, the Naval Force consisted of 252 ships and craft. As one Canadian Army report stated, “to move this great number of vessels across the Channel without detection by the enemy, without mishap, and on a timetable, was a most difficult and complicated task.”

  The force would sail in thirteen distinct groups. Comprising the first four groups were the LSIs and their small armed escorts. Group 5 was made up of No. 3 Commando’s R-Boats and escorts. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal were carried in the R-Boats and escorts of Group 6, while Group 7 consisted of the R-Boats carrying the Camerons and escorts. LCTs and escorts formed Groups 8 through 12, and the seven French chasseurs and the sloop HMS Alresford comprised Group 13. Escorts for the LSIs consisted of five destroyers, one being HMS Calpe. Hughes-Hallett and Roberts would be aboard this ship, which was fitted out with special communications equipment to serve as the raid’s headquarters. A duplicate headquarters existed aboard the destroyer HMS Fernie, which would provide escort for the LCTs and small landing craft flotillas. Brigadier Mann would be on Fernie, ready to take over command should Roberts be killed or incapacitated by wounds. If Mann fell, command passed to 6th Brigade’s Southam and then to 4th Brigade’s Lett. Were all the generals down, McNaughton’s staff representative, Lieutenant Colonel G.P. Henderson, would take charge.29 On the naval side, Commander David Luce would take over from Hughes-Hallett. Luce would be replaced by Commander H.V.P. McClintock, then Commander Red Ryder, and finally Commander G.T. Lambert.

  “During the passage across the channel,” Hughes-Hallett’s orders stated, “there are a large number of ships manoeuvring close to each other at varying speeds. It is of the utmost importance that Commanding Officers and in particular Senior Officers of groups in company and Senior officers of detached groups keep to their proper routes and timing by accurate navigation, not only so that the landing may be carried out according to plan, but also to avoid ships and groups meeting at night... Attention is drawn to the necessity of accurate station keeping. In order to prevent ships straggling with the possibility of becoming detached, senior officers of groups are to keep their groups closed up as much as possible at all times.”

  Once through the minefield, six of the destroyers would provide flank protection, with two to eastward and four westward. As the main force closed on the shore, these destroyers would dash back and rejoin it. Once the LSIs lowered and released their assault landing craft, they were to turn about for England to avoid being targeted by the German bombers expected to attack the Naval Force at first light.

  After supporting the Essex landing on Red Beach, Locust and the chasseurs would enter the harbour and unload the Royal Marine commandos and engineering demolition parties. Some commandos would work with these vessels as a “cutting out force” to take control of a number of barges standing at the docks. These had been intended for use by the Germans during their planned invasion of Britain. As many as possible would be towed out to sea and back to England. Those unable to be taken under tow would by destroyed, along with any other ships that could not be pirated away.

  Any landing craft en route to Dieppe that lost speed for one reason or another was to be abandoned by its group. Under no circumstances were group leaders to cease maintaining the speed required by the timetable—even if they encountered enemy forces. The group commanders were to “take drastic avoiding action if contact is made with enemy forces or to avoid contact if the enemy are known to be in the vicinity. But the proper course must be resumed as soon as it is considered safe to do so as timely arrival of groups, particularly the early ones, is vital to the operation.”

  Wireless silence was to be maintained until the Essex Scottish and Rileys began landing in front of Dieppe. The only exceptions were if someone discovered the force had been spotted by German ships, if an LSI commander realized his landing craft were going to be more than fifteen minutes late reaching the beach, or if the senior officer commanding Group 5 determined that, because of delays or casualties, the landings on the Yellow beaches were “seriously compromised.”

  “In an operation of this complexity,” Hughes-Hallett warned, “there is a great danger of signal congestion causing breakdown of communications. It is for this reason that the operational orders are prepared in much greater detail than would be necessary in normal operations.”30

  Whereas the plan for the passage and initial landing was set out in minute detail, this was impossible for the re-embarkation of troops and withdrawal across the Channel. A plan “could not be rigidly laid down because the tactical situation during the re-embarkation of troops cannot accurately be forecasted.” But Hughes-Hallett did offer a general guide. “The intention is that all tanks and the majority of the troops are re-embarked from Red and/or White beaches... The time at which withdrawal is to begin, and the speed at which it will take place is governed, as far as the Navy is concerned, by the times when the tide is suitable (i.e. rising).”

  If the raid took place between August 18 and 21, withdrawal would be carried out on a two-tide basis. On either the 22nd or 23rd, it would be on a one-tide basis. During the two tides, there would be a low-tide period when water levels at the beaches would prevent practicable re-embarkation of tanks and troops.

  The order to begin withdrawal—“Vanquish”—would be given jointly by Hughes-Hallett and Roberts. They would issue a start time for the withdrawal to begin, designated as “W.”31 Assuming a two-tide operation, the withdrawal would begin thirty minutes after “W” was announced, with the Royals being first to re-embark. Other battalions and units would follow in stages, with the last—the beach party and signals personnel—lifted free three hours and forty-five minutes after “W.”32

  These general orders were supplemented with specific orders governing the actions of naval beach parties, the commanders of the various landing craft, the destroyer captains, and anybody else with a commanding role. There were instructions detailing how and when smoke might be laid and how bombardments would be called for by shore-based forward observation officers. Wherever possible, Hughes-Hallett and his planners had removed any requirement to act on personal initiative. There was a script for everyone to follow, and if it was accorded to faithfully, all should be well.

  By comparison, the RAF plan was distinctly concise. This was partly due to the inevitably fluid nature of air support likely to be required. Leigh-Mallory had at his disposal a formidable force. Forty-six Spitfire squadrons and ten squadrons of Hurricanes provided the fighter cover. There were two squadrons of Hurricanes converted into fighter-bombers, three squadrons of Boston b
ombers, and two squadrons of Blenheim bombers—sixty-three squadrons in all.33 The Royal Canadian Air Force provided six of the fighter squadrons and two army cooperation squadrons (equipped with fighter-bombers). There were also one New Zealand, five Polish, two Czech, two Norwegian, one French, and one Belgian squadron. The rest were all RAF.34

  Leigh-Mallory’s pilots and crews faced a daunting task, for they would be required to operate “most intensively throughout the day from dawn until late afternoon.” With the entire raid playing out over a single day, there would be “a far heavier strain... on the air forces than would [be] the case had our occupation of Dieppe been more prolonged.” Air support by bombers and fighter-bombers would take the form of either attacks on targets or creation of smokescreens. The latter would be generated by Bostons and Blenheims dropping one-hundred-pound phosphorous smoke bombs from elevations of just fifty feet. Leigh-Mallory expected all Luftwaffe forces within range would be sent against the raiding force, so he wanted to maintain a constant rotating fighter cover over the entire area to protect the ships, his bombers, and the troops on the ground. His ability to communicate quickly and effectively with scores of squadrons based throughout southern England was critical. For this reason, he would remain at Group 11’s Uxbridge headquarters and personally direct the deployment of the squadrons based on reports sent by air force officers aboard Calpe, by Roberts, or by Hughes-Hallett.

  Ever the most cautious of the force command triad, Leigh-Mallory expected that the “attacks from the sea... under the supporting fire of destroyers only” would be met by “strong and well organised shore defences.” He must accordingly make “every effort to provide maximum air support and air cover during the initial assault” and then continue doing so until all forces had safely withdrawn to England.35