Breakout from Juno Page 17

  By 1900 hours, both forward companies had lost half their strength either killed or wounded. An 88-millimetre gun started shooting at any movement between ‘C’ Company and Gauvreau’s support group north of the farms, ending his ability to communicate with it by runner. He also learned the FOO, Captain Gordon Hunter, who had been with ‘B’ Company, was dead. That left Smith, isolated with ‘C’ Company, to direct the artillery. Then, at 1920 hours, there were so many Germans between Gauvreau’s position and the two farms that runners could no longer operate.34 Gauvreau could only hope that the Fusiliers could hang on through a long, deadly night.35

  AT 1750 HOURS, Major John Edmondson heard men shout, “Tanks!” As he spun around, four panzers charged into the left rear of ‘B’ Company. They were firing high-explosive shells and raking his men with machine guns. Nobody had managed to dig more than a few inches into the ground, so they were completely exposed in the pea field.36

  One tank rumbled into the midst of No. 12 Platoon, grinding men under its tracks while shooting at others. Edmondson shouted for the platoon’s PIAT man to fire. But the assistant, who had charge of the bomb fuses, was dead. As Edmondson turned to order the platoon sergeant to move his men towards the cover of a wheat field, the man was struck by a tank shell “and disappeared in front of me.” The men were running into the tall wheat of their own accord. A tank turret swung menacingly, its barrel aimed directly at Edmondson. He started running, looking over his shoulder, seeing machine-gun tracers honing in. A running dive carried him into the grain. Edmondson rolled left, stopped, rolled right. Bullets ripped the ground where he had been.37

  Edmondson saw German artillery flashing across the Orne River, and seconds later shells exploded all around. He started crawling and dashing through the wheat, organizing the remnants of ‘B’ Company. The Bren gunners had all been cut down covering the company’s withdrawal. No. 12 Platoon’s PIAT was gone. Lieutenant Bob Pulley and Lieutenant Cas Treleaven were deploying their PIAT teams. One of the teams knocked out a tank with two bombs. Another tank was hit, but whether it was immobilized was uncertain. Edmondson and his second-in-command, Captain Johnny Gates, told men to head north and get behind ‘D’ Company. Gates kept yelling into the wireless handset that they needed artillery, any bloody thing, but there was only static.

  The tanks were slashing the wheat with machine guns and growling around in circles to crush men or flush them into the open. Lieutenant Treleaven fell wounded. He would lay for an hour no less than twenty-five feet from one tank before managing to crawl away unseen. As the rest of the company moved back, Pulley stayed behind to provide cover. His body would not be discovered until early August.

  Edmondson and Gates had fragments of the company headquarters section and No. 12 Platoon with them. The other two platoons were also moving back in some semblance of order. Everyone crawled through the saturated wheat, their uniforms sodden. When Edmondson and Gates reached ‘D’ Company’s position, they found it had already pulled back. There were a few wounded men lying about, obviously overlooked in the withdrawal.38 “We stop here,” Edmondson told Gates. “Hold everybody who comes back. Start digging in. Create as much cover as you can.” Edmondson left to report to battalion headquarters.

  Chaos had reigned as the tanks punched in, and the shelling had risen to a fierce crescendo. When Major Len Dickin had seen the tanks boring into Edmondson’s company, he immediately thought of the battalion’s supporting anti-tank guns. They were just coming into position behind the two rear infantry companies. The crews of two 17-pounders from 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment’s ‘K’ Troop were still unhooking the guns when tanks destroyed them. The other gun crews managed to get their 17-pounder or 6-pounder guns deployed but were stuck in the open with no cover. Five tanks closed in for the kill. The anti-tank gunners never stood a chance.

  Dickin ordered his PIAT men to engage. Because of the tall wheat, the men could not fire from the normal prone position. So the teams tried firing while standing up. Exposed, both PIAT gunners were quickly cut down. Dickin started moving his men back, planning to take them behind the Saint-André–Hubert-Folie road. They could dig in behind the Essex Scottish and bolster that battalion’s defensive line. Dickin headed towards the rear, intent on contacting the Essex battalion commander and explaining his intentions.39

  Edmondson, meanwhile, had just about reached where the Sasks’ headquarters company should be when the signals officer, Lieutenant B.A. Smith, charged up. “Where the hell are you going?” Edmondson demanded. “I’m getting out of here,” Smith replied. “The headquarters has been knocked out. The Colonel has been killed. They knocked out the carrier and the company that was here has been ordered to withdraw.”40 More calmly, Smith explained that artillery fire had killed Major Reg Matthews and intelligence officer Lieutenant Doug Pedlow. They had been killed minutes after sending a message to 6th Brigade at 1750 that stated: “We are being attacked by tanks. We need help from the tank counterattack coming from the south.” There had been no response from brigade.41

  The wireless link to brigade had been lost with the command carrier, so Edmondson decided to go to Ifs and ask Brigadier Young for reinforcement. If he gave the Sasks tanks, the unfolding debacle might be reversed. When Edmondson reached the narrow road cutting across the ridge from Saint-Martin-de-Fontenay to Verrières, he happened on a battalion carrier. Edmondson hitched a ride to Ifs. As the carrier descended the ridge, Edmondson noticed many “small figures far down the slope in front of the Saint-André crossroads stand up and converge for a moment as if to consult and then double to the rear.” Edmondson realized these were Essex Scottish officers. As planned, the battalion had advanced to the Saint-André–Hubert-Folie road to support 6th Brigade’s collapsing attack. Edmondson thought the Essex “were in a precarious position and had to seek cover from the intense enemy fire.”42

  THE ESSEX SCOT TISH had advanced at 1727 hours, just twenty-three minutes before Major Matthews reported the tank attack. By the time the battalion reached the crossroads it was 1820 hours, and the Sasks were being slaughtered ahead in plain sight. Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Macdonald had barely ordered his companies to start digging in when Major Dickin arrived and told him the Sasks were falling back behind his position.43 Dickin then left for Ifs. Like Edmondson, he was determined to get brigade to send some support.44

  The Essex had advanced through intense German machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. Many men were lost. When the first men were struck, their friends tended to rush to help. But ‘A’ Company’s Major H.W.P. Thomson ordered them to keep going and leave the wounded to the stretcher-bearers. Minutes later, Thomson fell wounded. Lieutenant Tom Martin took over. By the time ‘A’ Company reached the crossroads, most of its platoon sections had lost half their strength killed or wounded. ‘B’ Company, also leading, had fared no better.

  Their objective was littered with dead and wounded from the South Saskatchewans. The two companies were immediately subjected to fire from German tanks. ‘B’ Company’s Major D.W. McIntyre consulted with Lieutenant Martin, and the two men agreed they should withdraw to the forming-up position east of Ifs. Otherwise, they faced elimination. Neither officer was in communication with battalion headquarters. As Martin returned to ‘A’ Company, he was badly wounded in both legs. After ordering the men back to the forming-up position, he bled to death.

  Having lost all their officers and most non-commissioned officers, ‘A’ Company crawled back through the wheat. Nobody provided direction. The men just went their own way. Corporal John Cross and his brother Ken, a private, stuck together. One would rise up to track the German tanks. When a tank rotated its turret away from them, he would shout for the other brother to move. Then they would alternate the process. All around, other men were being killed or wounded. Only a remnant of the company managed to escape.45

  ‘B’ Company’s withdrawal was better organized and was intercepted by Lieutenant Colonel Macdonald when it reached the two reserve companies. McIntyre had alread
y sent thirty of his men to help the wounded get back to the forming-up position, but Macdonald told him to dig the rest of the company in behind ‘D’ Company’s position.46 The situation was dire, what was left of the battalion being counterattacked by an estimated two companies of infantry and up to thirteen tanks.47

  Withdrawing in concert with ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies of the Essex were many South Saskatchewans. Captain George Lane had watched in dismay as the men streamed past where he had set up the 3-inch mortars behind the Essex reserve companies. There seemed to be countless walking wounded. Several carriers rumbled past overloaded with men suffering immobilizing wounds. The unwounded passed in small groups. Sometimes these were under command of a sergeant or corporal. Often they were just a collection of dispirited privates.48

  At brigade headquarters, Major Edmondson went straight to Brigadier Young. Matthews was dead, communications cut, the Sasks had withdrawn, and the area they vacated could now be saturated with artillery that would catch the Germans in the open, he said. “Take it easy, young man,” Young said. “You’re excited. Take it easy.” Edmondson denied being excited. If they got tanks and artillery, the Sasks could “save the battlefield.”

  Dickin arrived and reiterated Edmondson’s report, offering the same suggestions. Young interrupted. “Who’s senior here? ” Edmondson said, “Guess I am by two weeks.” Young told him to “go back and rally your battalion and hold them solid. We’ll do what we can.” Realizing arguing was useless, Edmondson headed back. Dickin stayed on, urging Young to commit more tanks, to call in artillery, but the brigadier finally dismissed him.49

  Edmondson found the battalion gathering at the forming-up position. He got sergeants to sort men into their respective companies and get them dug in. At 2030 hours, Edmondson counted one sergeant and thirteen men from ‘B’ Company remaining. As night fell, men were still trickling in.

  By 0800 hours the following morning, ‘B’ Company’s numbers had risen to Edmondson, Lieutenant Treleaven, and twenty-seven men—out of ninety-five who had gone into the attack.50 The final toll for the Saskatchewans was thirteen officers and 209 other ranks killed, wounded, or missing. In addition to the battalion’s acting commander, two company commanders were dead.51 ‘ K’ Troop of the 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment reported losing all four 17-pounders, seven men killed, and several others missing.52

  Out front of the Saskatchewan position, the Essex Scottish still held just north of the Saint-André–Hubert-Folie road. Lieutenant Colonel Macdonald moved through the perimeter at 2000 hours and talked to every man. He told them they “must hold … at all cost. Some were shaken a bit by the [Sasks] and ‘A’ and ‘B’ Coy withdrawals, but seemed reassured and steadied by my visit.”

  Macdonald then went back and organized the men at the forming-up position. He found about fifty men who were not walking wounded and marched them to brigade headquarters to get refitted with missing kit and ammunition. Told there was nothing for them, Macdonald decided the men might as well stay in the rear, get some rest and food, and be ready to return to the line in the morning.

  After he left, Young showed up. He sent to division for the necessary ammunition and equipment. At 0400 hours, Young ordered these men forward. Lieutenant A. McCrimmon, who had been LOB, had already rounded up about fourteen men an hour earlier and led them back to the crossroads. McCrimmon assumed command of ‘A’ Company. Dawn was fast approaching, and the Essex fully expected a counterattack they were ill prepared to repel.53

  [ 12 ]

  Not a Pleasant Picture

  AT 0130 HOURS on July 21, Major General Chris Foulkes told Brigadier Elliot Rodger at II Canadian Corps that “things were sticky and confused” on 6th Brigade’s front. While the rest of the battalions had been “repulsed” back to the Saint-André–Hubert-Folie road, the Queen’s Own Camerons “were okay.”1

  Earlier, Foulkes had apprised Lieutenant General Guy Simonds that 6th Brigade was in trouble. At 1800 hours on July 20, Simonds had accordingly ordered 5th Brigade’s Black Watch placed at Brigadier Hugh Young’s disposal and all of 2nd Armoured Brigade under 2nd Division’s command. Young was free to use the 1st Hussars to protect his left flank and redeploy all the Sherbrooke Fusiliers to reinforce the Camerons.

  The entire Canadian front, Simonds warned, was in “danger of caving in entirely,” clear back to Vaucelles.2 During the night of July 20 –21, the only good news was the absence of counterattacks against the Essex Scottish. But the heavy rain filled slit trenches and made the “task of keeping weapons in working order … almost impossible. The men worked continuously on their MGs, even tearing off their shirts for rags in a futile attempt to keep them in order,” the Essex war diarist recorded.3

  On Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal’s front the night had also brought a lull, the Germans only probing Troteval and Beauvoir Farms with small infantry patrols. Although easily driven off, the Germans captured a few men from ‘C’ Company at Troteval Farm.4

  Night brought no relief for the Camerons, as eight Panthers struck ‘D’ Company on the southern edge of Saint-André just before dusk. When the supporting 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment troop attempted to move three guns to meet the attack, all were knocked out. With the Panthers focused on the anti-tank guns, ‘D’ Company’s PIAT team crept in close and knocked two out. Despite this success, the tanks and accompanying infantry soon threatened to overrun the company.5 Lieutenant Colonel Norman Ross ordered it back five hundred yards to a position next to ‘B’ Company on the edge of the orchard. This meant surrendering most of Saint-André, but Ross felt the Camerons were too weak to hold the entire village and orchard both.6

  Although the tanks withdrew, German infantry continued counterattacking ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies through the rest of the night. In the pitch black, with rain cloaking their stealthy approach, the Germans were only detected when they were inside close-quarter fighting distance.

  At about 0230 hours, two German vehicles rolled blithely through Saint-André in the direction of Fleury-sur-Orne. The carrier platoon’s PIAT team punched both vehicles with bombs that killed their crews. The lead vehicle proved to be a half-track marked with a red cross but loaded with ammunition.7 Despite the half-track’s load, which contravened the Geneva Convention, Ross ordered the Red Cross markings covered over to avoid allegations of wrongdoing by the Camerons.8 A dreary dawn found the Camerons and Germans exchanging desultory small-arms fire.9

  ALL THREE 6TH Brigade battalions were facing strong German forces by the early morning of July 21. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal’s ‘B’ Company at Beauvoir Farm was completely surrounded and out of contact with Lieutenant Colonel Guy Gauvreau. From Troteval Farm, Major Fernand Mosseau and 4th Field Regiment’s FOO, Captain A. Britton Smith, could see Beauvoir. But they were unable to offer any assistance.

  Shortly after first light, artillery and mortar fire drenched both farms. Then SS panzer grenadiers charged in. At Troteval, ‘C’ Company easily repulsed the assault. ‘B’ Company, however, ran out of ammunition and was overrun. Smith and Mosseau watched helplessly as the survivors were taken prisoner.10

  About the same time Beauvoir Farm fell, several German tanks opened fire on the two Essex Scottish companies astride the Saint-André–Hubert-Folie road. As the morning wore on, tank and infantry attacks on ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies intensified. The situation was badly confused. Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Macdonald was unable to calculate his actual strength because of the disorganized state of the survivors from ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies. Some of these men were intermixed with the other two companies, while others apparently still remained at the forming-up position despite orders for them to come forward at dawn. At 0930 hours, Macdonald left to gather these men and urge Brigadier Hugh Young to send armoured support.

  Macdonald was consequently gone when the Germans managed to cut off ‘C’ Company, ‘D’ Company’s No. 17 Platoon, and battalion headquarters from the rest of the Essex force. Helpless against the tanks, men from both groups began withdrawing while other
s surrendered. Lieutenant L.R. Morgan and most of No. 17 Platoon put down their arms. Battalion headquarters scattered. Lieutenant K. Jeanneret, the signals officer, spent hours crawling through the high wheat. Intelligence officer Lieutenant W.C. Wilson and most of the headquarters staff were captured.11 By 1100 hours, fugitives from the crossroads began trickling in to where Young had ordered Macdonald to have the ‘A’ and ‘B’ Company remnants form a new line in front of Ifs.12

  Around noon, uncertain about the Essex dispositions and seeing German tanks less than a mile from Ifs, Young feared losing the village itself and ordered the Black Watch to advance and establish a defensive line on Point 61, a thousand yards south of Ifs. He also placed two squadrons of the 1st Hussars on the edge of the village. Not sure if there were still Essex Scottish on the Saint-André– Hubert-Folie road, Young set the Black Watch advance for 1800 hours. This would allow time to ascertain if any men remained there who would be caught in the supporting artillery barrage and send a warning for them to withdraw.13

  WHILE YOUNG WAS fixated on rescuing the centre of his line, the Camerons and Fusiliers clung to their positions with little support. At 0900 hours, the Camerons spotted tanks on the heights both to the east and south of Saint-André. German infantry then crossed the Orne River and attempted to infiltrate ‘A’ Company’s lines. Captain Bob Lucy, 6th Field Regiment’s FOO, broke this effort with artillery, and many of the Germans chose to surrender rather than attempt a river crossing under shellfire. Throughout the day, the Germans repeatedly pounded the Camerons with mortar fire followed by an infantry assault.14