Tragedy at Dieppe Read online

  On April 18, a further meeting was held at COHQ, with Major General Haydon presiding. In addition to most COHQ planners, representatives from the general staff of Home Forces, the Home Forces planning section, and the Airborne Division attended. Although Hughes-Hallett was unable to attend, he had ensured that his view that “a frontal assault would be unduly hazardous” was on record. Despite this objection, the consensus of those attending was that “on balance there were advantages in taking the town by a frontal assault.” As no minutes were written during this meeting, nobody could say afterwards how this consensus was reached.29

  Three days later, Haydon chaired another meeting aimed at further developing the frontal-attack scheme. Unlike many COHQ meetings about Operation Rutter, this one was recorded in fairly extensive minutes. Originally, an initial assault wave of infantry and tanks was to have landed a half hour after nautical twilight, the period when the centre of the sun is between six and twelve degrees below the horizon. Bright stars are still visible in clear weather—a condition the raid depended on—and the horizon is coming into view. Yet it remains too dark on land to move about easily without artificial lighting. Nautical twilight in the early summer off the French coast would begin at just before 0600 hours, so the first flight of landing craft was to gain the beach in front of Dieppe at about 0630 hours.

  Hughes-Hallett and Commander Luce, however, argued that landing tanks in the first flight would mean losing the element of surprise. The tanks would be carried to the beach by specially designed craft called Landing Craft Tank (LCT), which necessarily were larger and had a higher profile than the small craft used for landing infantry. German observers, the naval officers said, would easily spot the LCTs heading in about two hours before dawn. Attempting to approach the beach earlier, while it was still completely dark, risked the LCTs grounding on various obstacles “resulting in stranding and consequent confusion.”

  Accordingly, it was decided a first flight of infantry would land in front of Dieppe thirty minutes after nautical twilight. The moment they touched down would be designated Zero Hour. At the same time, a parachute battalion would drop near the Forêt d’Arques, about six miles inland from the beach. Glider troops would also be landed inland from the beaches on the flanks, while smaller groups of paratroops would descend to “deal with mobile batteries and any additional targets outside the port.” There would be a “simultaneous air bombardment against the town and sea front.”

  The main landing force, consisting of one tank squadron and two infantry battalions, would land on the seafront forty-five minutes after Zero Hour. The rest of the tank force would follow sometime between Zero plus 120 minutes and 180 minutes. Engineers and other support troops “required for demolitions on the approaches to the town and in the town would accompany the forces” in the main and follow-on landings. No landing of tanks would occur at Pourville because this seemed “more difficult than was supposed at first.”

  Continuous fighter cover while the troops were ashore was considered vital. Fighter cover generally “would take the form of a moderate degree of cover throughout the hours of daylight with maximum intensity at certain hours when the danger to the naval force and small craft was greatest.” These periods were estimated to be for about two hours after the follow-on tank landing and from the “time loading commences until dusk.”

  Offensive air bombardment was to “continue from Z+30 to Z+85 at high and low level. The high altitude attack will be against the town generally. The low level attack will concentrate against the sea front and beach defences.

  “The withdrawal and re-embarkation would have to start with some of the tanks about 8 hours after zero. These would be followed by infantry. The maximum number of infantry would embark from the harbour itself rather than from the sea front.”30

  On April 25, Mountbatten chaired a meeting “to thrash out the pros and cons of the two plans.”31 He and the COHQ planners again opposed the frontal assault, pointing out “that so far as the main object of the raid was concerned, it really did not matter very much whether Dieppe was captured or not, and that this would make but little difference to the main purpose of the operation, namely, to gain experience.” The representatives of the Home Forces (Montgomery not attending) however said it was their commander’s view “that if we did not capture the town, the operation would be represented for ever afterwards as a failure.”32

  They argued that “if a force were landed as far from Dieppe as Quiberville, it would be difficult to achieve surprise against the town itself; while furthermore tanks put ashore there would have to cross two rivers (the Saane and the Scie) en route to Dieppe. This would necessitate arrangements for seizing the bridges to prevent their being demolished. In addition it was believed that Dieppe itself was probably held only by a ‘single low-category battalion’ [of about 1,400 men], though this was supported by a considerable number of guns.”33 Intelligence staff calculated it would “take five hours to reinforce the garrison and only after eight hours would the reinforcements be arriving in any considerable strength. At the end of fifteen hours the maximum number of enemy troops taking part in the defence... would not exceed 6,500 men.”34

  Hughes-Hallett and his fellow naval planners “still expressed doubt about the frontal assault, but not on naval grounds.” To allay their concern, the army and air representatives emphasized that an air bombardment “of maximum intensity” would be put in immediately before the frontal assault, “and it was thought that the defence would be too confused by it and by subsequent attacks from low flying aircraft to be in a position to offer stout or prolonged resistance.”

  The Chiefs of Staff had earlier decided that ultimate authority for the army part of a divisional raiding plan rested with the Home Forces and, consequently, Montgomery. As Montgomery and his staff were set on the raid being anchored on a frontal assault, Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett had no option but to give way.

  Attention now turned to what troops would carry out the raid. Mountbatten wanted to use the Royal Marine Division, supported by commandos. Both formations, he felt, were “well trained for the job.” Again the final decision was not his. Authority for selecting the troops rested with General Paget.35

  As the plan now called for tanks to join the frontal assault on Dieppe, it was imperative to know whether they could surmount the seawall stretching from the western cliff in front of the beach to the harbour mouth. A Major Robinson serving with the clandestine Special Operations Executive, who had spent much time before the war visiting Dieppe, maintained that there were three ramps leading up from the beach onto the seawall. But aerial reconnaissance was unable to confirm this, as shadows from the adjacent tall cliffs rendered clear, detailed photography next to impossible.

  The planners consequently turned to an unnamed person who had lived near Dieppe for more than twenty years. He assured them that “the shingle [pebbles] on the beach washes up to the top of the sea-wall and that there is direct access from the beach to the promenade over the top of the sea-wall which, in such cases, does not form an obstacle.”

  However, two aerial photographs taken the previous summer clearly showed an unramped “sea-wall at the western end of the beach near the casino.” Undaunted, the planners concluded optimistically that “whilst this contradicts the reported statement, it may be, however, that in normal times the western end of the sea-wall is kept clear as being in front of the casino and probably the most frequented part of the beach, whereas the eastern part of the beach was more neglected and the shingle allowed to pile up against the sea-wall.”36

  That Dieppe—occupied by German troops, with its casino and all its beachfront hotels closed—was experiencing anything but normal times was not noted. So there was no allowance for the possibility that the Germans might consider the seawall a significant defensive feature they would do everything in their power to make as effective an obstacle as possible.

  Information on th
e rivers within the operational area was equally scanty. All were described accurately as “slow flowing, meandering,” and running along “flat-bottomed valleys with a slight fall towards the coast.” Their banks were low, with flat grass meadows lying on either side. As none were navigable, there was “no information regarding their widths or depths.” The Saane and Scie were believed to be no more than thirty feet wide at their mouths and unlikely to be more than six to eight feet deep. The Arques, which emptied into Dieppe harbour, was about sixty feet wide at its mouth.

  “So far as the question of these rivers being tank obstacles is concerned, it is considered that this is entirely seasonal. It is known that the rivers Saane and Scie flood in the spring, but from aerial photographs the flooding appears to be near the mouth. It is not so much the depth or extent of the floods that would form an obstacle to tanks, but the resultant softness of the river banks which might quite well prove unable to bear any heavy loads. In summer and early autumn it is not considered that either the river Saane or Scie would be wide enough or deep enough to form tank obstacles. One feature in this respect is, however, worth noting and that is that on the river Scie from a point of about [2.5] miles upstream from its mouth to a point about 5 miles upstream there are no less than 10 waterfalls which may well consist of small dams and may thus mean that the river is deeper than would be expected from its natural features.”

  Photographs had revealed numerous footpaths leading down to the rivers at various points, and the analysts concluded that “fords may exist at these points. In many places footpaths bridge the rivers thus proving that they are narrow and easily bridged.”37

  Besides getting a feel for the terrain, the planners also sought to understand what enemy forces were present. As the raiders were expected to be ashore for fifteen hours, it was theoretically possible for German reinforcements to move to the Dieppe area from distances of one to two hundred miles away and present a threat. Where were these forces situated, and how soon could they reach the port once tactical surprise was lost? Presented with a series of questions in this regard on April 17, army intelligence responded a few days later.

  “The only enemy armoured forces known to be in France are around Paris,” the intelligence report stated. “They are believed to be equipped with only one to two hundred light French tanks. It is not believed that these could go into action at Dieppe within fifteen hours.”

  As for the Germans at Dieppe, they were reportedly a battalion from the 302nd Infantry Division equipped for coastal defence, which likely meant they were “short of mortars and anti-tank equipment. The troops are second-rate and are not mobile.” It was also thought that the Dieppe regiment’s Infantry Gun Company and Anti-Tank Company were in the area (meaning some presence of light artillery and anti-tank guns). Additionally, divisional troops providing a field artillery battery, and “considerable elements” of the “Anti-Tank and Engineer Battalions and of the Supply Unit” were believed to be close to or inside Dieppe. Mobile artillery batteries were certainly in the area, but their positions had not been located. These batteries might field 75-millimetre, 105-millimetre, or 150-millimetre guns. There were also definitely light anti-aircraft batteries armed with either 20-millimetre or 37-millimetre guns. Again, where these batteries were situated was unknown.

  All told, the forces immediately available in the Dieppe area numbered about 1,400. During the first five hours, however, it could be expected that two battalions could arrive as reinforcements—one from the south and the other the west. Another two infantry companies could move in from coastal positions close by. There were also divisional troops that might advance from the suspected headquarters at Arques. Altogether these totalled about 2,500. Within eight hours of the raid beginning, further reinforcement of about 2,400 men could start flowing in from the Rouen area. By the fifteen-hour mark, as many as 6,500 Germans could be engaged at Dieppe.38

  As the intelligence flowed in, it became increasingly clear to the COHQ planners that the “task was hazardous.” But in the words of one Combined Operations report, “so is any operation of war.” And Dieppe’s “defences could... be taken as a fair sample of what the attackers [involved in the eventual cross-channel invasion] might have to meet at whatever point an assault was launched along the coast of Northern France.”39

  Having assembled an operational plan and gathered much intelligence—as dubious and vague as it might be—COHQ’s staff were now ready to involve the naval, air, and, most importantly, army forces that would actually carry out the raid. Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett were both surprised that instead of the combined force including the Royal Marine Division and supporting commandos they had suggested, a division of Canadians would form the raiding force’s core. Neither man knew anything about the Canadians or their capabilities. But Mountbatten was told by General Alan Brooke that the Canadians desired “to be brought into a raiding operation as soon as possible.”

  Some other operation, perhaps, Mountbatten countered. The raid under consideration “was such a large and uncertain operation,” he cautioned. “We were trying to find out things and even if successful in all our aims there would be nothing much to show for it to the outside world and we were bound to have heavy casualties... this was the very last operation on which untried and inexperienced Canadian troops should be used. They would not be able to cover themselves with glory however successful the operation and would be bound to suffer heavy casualties which would appear to be difficult to justify.”

  Mountbatten later recalled “going on and on at Brookie and asking not to have to take the Canadians. However he said that [Lieutenant General Harry] Crerar was absolutely adamant that they should be used and that the P.M. was prepared to accept them. I was over-ridden and I remember Brookie saying to me that now more than ever the land forces plan must be made by Home Forces themselves and the Canadians must be brought into the planning at once and take the final responsibility with Monty for the army plan.”40

  3. A Fantastic Conception

  On April 27, I Canadian Corps commander Lieutenant General Harry Crerar was summoned to Montgomery’s headquarters in Dover. “Crerar,” Montgomery said in his direct manner, “you have been wanting action for a long time. Here’s your chance.” An infantry division supported by tanks was to raid a French port, and Montgomery believed the plan had “a lot of possibilities. The raid is yours, if you want it. If you accept, then the commander of the division you nominate will be responsible for producing a detailed plan in cooperation with Combined Ops, under the general authority of myself and Mountbatten. Do you want it?”

  “You bet we want it,” Crerar replied.

  “Then you have it. The target is Dieppe.”1

  When Crerar nominated 2nd Canadian Infantry Division for the task, Montgomery agreed this was the best choice.2 Having observed the division’s performance during the three-day Exercise Beaver III, a mock invasion begun on April 22, Montgomery had concluded that 2nd Division’s new commander, Major General John Hamilton Roberts, was “the best divisional commander in the [Canadian] Corps.”3

  This was actually faint praise, because Montgomery’s opinion of the other Canadian divisional generals was largely negative. Major General George Pearkes, a Great War Victoria Cross winner, had assumed command of 1st Division upon Crerar’s 1940 elevation to corps command. After Beaver III, Montgomery commented that Pearkes would “fight his division” to the last man, and “the last man would be killed all too soon.”4

  For its part, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had only finished deploying to England at the end of September 1941 and was still finding its feet under another Great War veteran, Major General Basil Price. Although he had won both a Distinguished Service Order and Distinguished Conduct Medal during the last war, Price was proving a lacklustre divisional commander.5

  Crerar’s opinion of Roberts was mixed, and he had criticized the man’s performance during Beaver III. Forward uni
ts, playing the defender role against 1st Division’s invaders, had been deployed for passive defence rather than being readied to quickly switch over to offensive counterattacks at the first opportunity. Divisional staff work had been clumsy and rushed.6 But Crerar would not let such concerns get in the way of securing the Dieppe raid for Canada. He had spent far too many months lobbying for precisely such an opportunity.

  Montgomery cautioned Crerar to keep the offer confidential until he was able to present it to First Canadian Army commander Lieutenant General Andrew McNaughton. The last thing Montgomery wanted was any suggestion that he had gone behind the prickly senior Canadian officer’s back to first secure Crerar’s consent. This was purely a matter of protocol—both Crerar and Montgomery considered the deal now done. McNaughton, elevated to command of the newly minted First Canadian Army on April 6, was poorly positioned to refuse Montgomery. The previous September, McNaughton and Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, General Bernard Paget had discussed Canadian troops participating in cross-channel raids against the French coast. The current offer could be considered a natural progression towards that objective. Since the Canadians had been shifted from Aldershot to Sussex, Paget had been sending small detachments for combined operations training at Chichester Harbour. McNaughton, meanwhile, had overseen the drafting of plans for Canadians to possibly participate in two minor raids during the winter, only to have each cancelled due to lack of landing craft.7

  In truth, McNaughton was lukewarm on the idea of committing Canadians to raiding operations. During the Great War, he had proved a brilliant artillery officer with a fine scientific mind and ended the war as a brigadier and holder of a Distinguished Service Order. He was also as implacable a nationalist as Crerar, while strongly disagreeing on how Canada’s role in the war should be conducted. Crerar was all for casting Canadians into battle at first opportunity. McNaughton was determined to keep the Canadian Army in England together and feared British desires to disperse it to suit their immediate needs.8